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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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25X1 REFERENCES

1. The majority of non-communist Yugoslav intellectuals have almost completely lost faith in the desire or intention of the United States to free Yugoslavia from the present communist regime. This feeling of disillusionment has been brought about by the following circumstances:
  - a. President Eisenhower's pre-election speech concerning the great desire of the United States to liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe gave heart to the vast majority of the Yugoslav populace. Events since the 1952 presidential election, however, have proven to them that the United States Government has neither the intention nor the desire to free them from the yoke of communism. On the contrary, the United States continues to give millions of dollars to the Tito regime which benefits none save the members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, now known as the Federation of Yugoslav Communists (FCY), and their collaborators.
  - b. Most Yugoslavs, except the Slovenes and faithful members of the Party, were secretly delighted by the Anglo-American decision of 8 October 1953 on Trieste, seeing in it the first step toward a new policy of firmness toward Tito on the part of the United States. However, when the United States failed to act in the face of Tito's threats, the general populace concluded that the allies had once again demonstrated the weakness of their policy toward Yugoslavia.
  - c. The fact that the United States not only failed to implement the 8 October decision, but extended additional economic aid, was construed by many Yugoslav intellectuals as final proof that the United States Government will take no action to force the present regime to introduce even

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a small amount of democracy into the country. These intellectuals realize, however, that the Yugoslav people are indebted to the United States for what little improvement in the standard of living which has been made during the last few years. However, this does not mitigate the feeling that they have been spiritually abandoned by the United States.

2. With regard to Anglo-American policy on Trieste, most non-communist intellectuals believe that not only did the United States fail the Yugoslav people in bowing to Tito's threats but also betrayed the Italian Government, which had been promised Trieste. Thus these intellectuals reason that no trust can be placed in the declaration of a government which will betray even one of its closest allies.
3. The belief that the Yugoslav people have been abandoned by the United States, together with the defeat of the Djilas faction and the criticism of his theses, which most intellectuals heartily supported, has resulted in the growth of a feeling of apathy in this intellectual group. Most of them now believe that there is no hope of interference in Yugoslavia from the West and have decided that the only action to take is to collaborate with the Tito regime, even to the degree of joining the Party. According to at least one of the source's informants, the only thing left in life is to look out for oneself and live as comfortably as possible.

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